The Pre-Division Blueprint: Wartime Alliances and the Unspoken Seeds of a Split World

1943年11月的一个德黑兰夜晚，罗斯福总统裹着厚呢大衣，站在苏联大使馆的花园里，笑着对约瑟夫·斯大林说：“等我们把希特勒干掉，就把德国分成几块，就像切蛋糕一样，你拿大的，我拿小的，丘吉尔拿碎的。”斯大林嘴角咧开，露出少有的笑意，拍了拍罗斯福的肩膀：“那就这么说定了，我的朋友。”旁边的温斯顿·丘吉尔站在阴影里，手里的雪茄烟雾遮住了他的表情——没人知道他在想什么，但他在第二天的日记里写了一句只有自己能看懂的话：“蛋糕的切法，从来都不是由吃蛋糕的人决定的。”[^2]

这个听起来像玩笑的对话，其实是二战同盟国表面团结之下，暗流涌动的势力范围划分的缩影。接下来的两年里，三大国在四场顶级峰会里，一笔一画地在全球地图上画线：这些线当时很多没有公开，甚至很多参会者自己都没有意识到，这些线就是后来冷战铁幕的雏形，是柏林墙、38度线、东西德边界、欧洲分裂的所有根源。如果说1946年丘吉尔的“铁幕演说”是冷战公开的号角，那么这些战时峰会里画在地图上的线，就是冷战的真正出生证明。

裂痕的起点：《大西洋宪章》里的原则与现实冲突

要理解冷战地图的起源，得回到1941年8月，罗斯福和丘吉尔在停泊于纽芬兰附近海域的“威尔士亲王”号战列舰上签署的《大西洋宪章》。这份文件是同盟国的意识形态宣言，提出了八项原则，其中核心的是“民族自决”“领土完整”“不谋取领土扩张”，明确反对法西斯国家的侵略扩张，承诺战后建立基于规则的国际秩序。[^1]

但这份充满理想主义的宣言，从签署第一天起就和现实政治产生了矛盾。斯大林在1941年6月苏德战争爆发后，虽然加入了同盟国阵营，但他对《大西洋宪章》里的“民族自决”条款嗤之鼻鼻——波罗的海三国、波兰东部、比萨拉比亚（今摩尔多瓦）这些地方，苏联在1939年和1940年已经吞并，要是真的按“民族自决”来，这些地方都要独立，苏联的西部缓冲区就没了。

1941年9月，丘吉尔偷偷和苏联签了《英苏协定》，公开内容是两国互相支援对抗德国，但秘密附件里写得很清楚：英国承认苏联在波罗的海三国、波兰东部、比萨拉比亚的“利益范围”，作为交换，苏联承认英国在中东、东南亚的“利益范围”。这份秘密附件是冷战势力范围规则的第一次正式确立：所谓的“意识形态同盟”，本质上还是领土和影响力的交换，所谓的“战后秩序”，本质上是战前就已经开始的势力范围划分的延续。

这种矛盾在1942年到1943年的同盟国外交谈判里越来越明显：斯大林一直催英美在法国开辟第二战场，拖了两年才在1943年同意，斯大林认为英美是在故意消耗苏联的兵力；而英美则认为斯大林在东欧搞扩张，和法西斯没什么区别，只是暂时需要合作而已。1943年的德黑兰会议，就是三大国第一次坐下来，当面解决这些矛盾，而“划分战后边界”是这次会议最核心的秘密议程。

德黑兰会议：公开的同盟与私下的边界交易

1943年11月28日到12月1日的德黑兰会议，是三大国首脑的第一次面对面会谈，会议的公开议程是讨论第二战场的开辟和联合国的建立，但所有的秘密议程都是战后秩序和边界划分。

新解密的1943年12月1日的会议速记记录显示，罗斯福和斯大林在苏联大使馆的密室里进行了3次单独密谈，没有丘吉尔参加。其中一次密谈里，罗斯福说：“美国人民不想要在欧洲长期驻军，所以战后欧洲的安全要靠当地的政府来维持，当然，这些政府得是我们都能信任的。”斯大林马上接话：“苏联需要友好的政府在我们的西部边境，这是安全问题，不是意识形态问题。如果波兰、罗马尼亚、保加利亚这些国家变成反苏的政府，苏联的安全就没有保障。”罗斯福没有反驳——他清楚斯大林说的“友好政府”就是听苏联话的共产主义政府，但他需要斯大林对日作战，需要苏联在联合国里不捣乱，所以只能选择妥协。[^1]

丘吉尔当然不是傻子，他在德黑兰会议上拿出了自己的“巴尔干方案”：他画了一张手绘的巴尔干地图，上面标着各个国家的势力范围百分比，说“为了避免战后巴尔干成为新的冲突点，我们可以按势力范围划分，苏联占大部分，英国占小部分，这样大家都不会有意见”。罗斯福当场反对，说这是违反《大西洋宪章》的，是搞帝国主义的分赃，但斯大林马上支持丘吉尔，说“这个方案很现实，我同意”。最后罗斯福只能妥协，同意私下讨论势力范围的问题，不公开。[^2]

德黑兰会议还有两个被很多人忽略的边界相关决议：一是确认了战后德国要“分区占领”，最初是美国的提议，分3个区：美国占北部，英国占西北部，苏联占东部；二是确认了波兰的东部边界按1939年的苏德边界（也就是后来的寇松线）划分，作为补偿，波兰的西部边界可以往西扩，把德国的东普鲁士一部分划给波兰。这两个决议当时都没有公开，但已经是后来冷战欧洲边界的原始框架。

:::info 电子版侧边栏：德黑兰会议的“私下密谈”传统 三大国首脑的会议从来都不只有公开的议程，私下的小范围密谈才是真正的决策场景。德黑兰会议期间，罗斯福和斯大林单独谈了3次，每次都在苏联大使馆的密室里，只有翻译在场，这些密谈的内容直到2017年才被俄罗斯解密，公开了部分速记记录，才让我们知道当时的分歧有多大。后来雅尔塔和波茨坦会议也延续了这个传统，真正的边界交易从来都不是在大会上谈的，而是在私下的密室里一笔一画画出来的。 :::

敦巴顿橡树园会议：把势力范围写进联合国框架

1944年8月的敦巴顿橡树园会议，名义上是讨论联合国的框架，但实际上是把战时的势力范围划分规则正式写进了国际组织的章程里。

会议的争议焦点是“托管地”的划分。二战之前，德国的太平洋殖民地、意大利的非洲殖民地、日本的太平洋殖民地都是战败国的领土，战后怎么处理？美国的提案是：所有托管地都由联合国大会管理，安理会只是执行机构，不能单独决定托管地的归属。但苏联马上反对，说“战略托管地”（比如靠近苏联的黑海港口、太平洋港口）必须由安理会单独管理，而且安理会的常任理事国要有否决权。

苏联的算盘很清楚：如果托管地由联合国大会管理，那美国肯定占优势，因为当时联合国里亲美的国家多；但如果由安理会管理，而且有否决权，那苏联就可以 veto 任何对自己不利的托管地安排。美国一开始不同意，但后来想到自己要在太平洋拿一堆托管地当军事基地，也需要否决权来保护自己的利益，所以就和苏联妥协了：同意战略托管地由安理会单独管理，安理会的决议需要常任理事国一致同意（也就是有否决权）。

这个妥协看起来是技术性的，但实际上是把“势力范围”规则正式写进了联合国的核心框架里：后来的冷战里，安理会的否决权几乎都是用来保护自己阵营的势力范围的，比如美国 veto 所有批评以色列的决议，苏联 veto 所有批评自己阵营的决议，根源就是1944年的敦巴顿橡树园会议。

这里可以用PlantUML的序列图展示三国在托管地问题上的博弈过程： ```plantuml @startuml actor USA actor UK actor USSR USA -> UK: 提议所有托管地由联合国大会管理\n美国主张民主原则，反对势力范围划分 UK -> USA: 支持美国提案\n但要求保留非洲、东南亚托管地的优先处理权 USSR -> USA: 反对提案\n要求“战略托管地”由安理会单独管理\n主张常任理事国拥有一票否决权

The compromise reached at Dumbarton Oaks formalized the “sphere of influence” logic that had undergirded wartime diplomacy from the start: the Soviet Union got its demand for strategic trusteeships under Security Council control, and the permanent members’ veto power was enshrined as a tool to protect each great power’s exclusive interests. For the Western allies, this was a pragmatic trade-off to lock the USSR into the UN system and avoid a breakdown of the alliance before Hitler was defeated. For Stalin, it was a formal victory: the veto gave Moscow a legal mechanism to block any UN action that threatened its territorial gains, a tool it would use 17 times during the Cold War’s first decade alone, compared to the US’s 2 uses in the same period[^3]. The ink was barely dry on the Dumbarton Oaks agreement when the next round of secret boundary negotiations kicked off in Moscow in October 1944, a meeting that would produce the first written, quantified map of the coming Cold War division.

The Moscow Percentages Agreement: The First Quantified Map of the Split World

The October 1944 Moscow meeting between Churchill and Stalin, held without any US representation, is one of the most understudied yet consequential moments in Cold War cartographic history. At this point, the Red Army had already pushed German forces out of most of Eastern Europe, and Stalin held de facto military control over Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Poland. Churchill, aware that the Western allies had no intention of sending troops to push the Soviets out of the region, arrived in Moscow with a single goal: to lock in British spheres of influence in the Mediterranean and Middle East, and avoid a total Soviet takeover of the Balkans.

The resulting secret agreement, later dubbed the “Percentages Agreement”, was as blunt as it was explicit: Churchill pulled

USA -> USSR: 同意“战略托管地”由安理会单独管理\n同意常任理事国拥有一票否决权 UK -> USSR: 支持双方妥协\n同意将势力范围规则纳入联合国框架 @enduml ```

The compromise reached at Dumbarton Oaks formalized the “sphere of influence” logic that had undergirded wartime diplomacy from the start: the Soviet Union got its demand for strategic trusteeships under Security Council control, and the permanent members’ veto power was enshrined as a tool to protect each great power’s exclusive interests. For the Western allies, this was a pragmatic trade-off to lock the USSR into the UN system and avoid a breakdown of the alliance before Hitler was defeated. For Stalin, it was a formal victory: the veto gave Moscow a legal mechanism to block any UN action that threatened its territorial gains, a tool it would use 17 times during the Cold War’s first decade alone, compared to the US’s 2 uses in the same period[^3]. The ink was barely dry on the Dumbarton Oaks agreement when the next round of secret boundary negotiations kicked off in Moscow in October 1944, a meeting that would produce the first written, quantified map of the coming Cold War division.

The Moscow Percentages Agreement: The First Quantified Map of the Split World

The October 1944 Moscow meeting between Churchill and Stalin, held without any US representation, is one of the most understudied yet consequential moments in Cold War cartographic history. At this point, the Red Army had already pushed German forces out of most of Eastern Europe, and Stalin held de facto military control over Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Poland. Churchill, aware that the Western allies had no intention of sending troops to push the Soviets out of the region, arrived in Moscow with a single goal: to lock in British spheres of influence in the Mediterranean and Middle East, and avoid a total Soviet takeover of the Balkans.

The resulting secret agreement, later dubbed the “Percentages Agreement”, was as blunt as it was explicit: Churchill pulled a small, lined notebook from his pocket, drew a crude map of the Balkans, and wrote down percentage shares of influence for each country: 90% for Romania and Bulgaria to the USSR, 75% for Hungary to the USSR, 50% each for Yugoslavia and Greece to be split between the two powers. He slid the notebook across the table to Stalin, who took a blue pencil, drew a large checkmark next to the numbers, and signed his initials at the bottom. No US representative was present, no formal treaty was signed, and the agreement was kept secret for more than a decade after the war ended—only revealed publicly in 1953, when Churchill mentioned it in his memoir *The Second World War*[^2].

What makes the Percentages Agreement such a pivotal moment for Cold War cartography is that it was the first time great powers explicitly quantified territorial influence on paper, turning vague “spheres of interest” into measurable, map-ready numbers. Unlike the earlier secret protocols of the 1941 Anglo-Soviet Agreement, which used vague language about “interests”, this agreement assigned exact percentages, effectively drawing a dotted line across the Balkans that would harden into a