Geographic and Historical Pre-Conditions: From Bao'an County to a Designated Special Zone
The narrative of Shenzhen as a *tabula rasa*—a blank slate upon which the modern Chinese metropolis was inscribed—is among the most enduring and powerful myths of its origin story. This constructed imagery, while rhetorically useful for propaganda and pedagogically simple for textbook explanations, obscures a far more complex and politically deliberate reality. The conditions preceding 1979 were not an accidental void but a specific configuration of geographic marginality, historical sedimentation, and institutional constraint that was *actively selected* by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership as the optimal laboratory for experimental reform. This chapter dismantles the "blank slate" premise by establishing the concrete baseline conditions of the Bao'an County region in 1978. It argues that Shenzhen's "emptiness" was a relative and political judgment, not an objective fact, made against the backdrop of a densely populated Pearl River Delta and a highly institutionalized, if economically stagnant, planned economy. The analysis proceeds through four interlocking strata: the region's physical geography and its implications for connectivity and defense; its deep historical role as a migration corridor and agricultural frontier; the extant institutional architecture of the planned economy and border control; and the precise demographic and land-use inventory of 1978. The chapter concludes by reconstructing the internal policy debates of 1978–1979, demonstrating how the choice of Shenzhen was a calculated trade-off between symbolic signaling, risk containment, and practical feasibility.
**1.1 Geographic Marginality as Strategic Advantage: The Physical Pre-Conditions**
The region designated as the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in 1979 occupies a 327.5 square kilometer strip of land at the southern tip of the Pearl River Delta, immediately north of the New Territories of British Hong Kong. Its geographic character is defined not by centrality but by profound marginality—a condition that paradoxically became its primary asset. A cadastral and topographic analysis of 1978 maps and survey records reveals a fragmented landscape of coastal plains, rocky hills, and estuarine inlets, crisscrossed by four primary river systems: the Shenzhen River (forming the border with Hong Kong), the Maozhou River, the Longgang River, and the Pingshan River. This physiography created natural barriers that were historically conducive to defense but inhibitory to internal integration.
The most critical geographic feature was the Shenzhen River and the Deep Bay (Houhai) estuary, which formed a 42-kilometer boundary with British Hong Kong. Prior to 1949, this border was porous, facilitating daily cross-border movement for trade, labor, and family ties. After the establishment of the People's Republic of China, the border was heavily fortified. The 1950s and 1960s saw the construction of the "Second Line" (二线) border defenses, comprising barbed wire fences, watchtowers, and military checkpoints, particularly along the Shenzhen River where the terrain was flatter and crossing easier. This militarization transformed the region from a transit corridor into a sealed frontier. The 1978 land survey conducted by the Bao'an County Land Management Bureau recorded that approximately 18% of the SEZ's eventual territory was classified as "border defense zone" (边防区), land rendered economically unusable by its proximity to the frontier and subject to strict access controls.
A second defining geographic condition was the lack of deep-water port infrastructure. While the coastline featured natural harbors like Yantian and Chiwan, these were undeveloped in 1978, suitable only for fishing junks and small coastal vessels. The dominant mode of long-distance transport was the congested Guangzhou–Kowloon Railway, which terminated at the Lo Wu border crossing, physically bypassing the Shenzhen area. The 1978 infrastructure inventory compiled by the Guangdong Provincial Transportation Department listed only 78 kilometers of paved roads within the future SEZ, most of which were narrow, two-lane county roads connecting agricultural townships. The absence of a major port, international airport, or railway hub meant that Shenzhen was not a pre-existing logistics node; it was a geographic non-place in the regional transportation network.
This marginality was not absolute. The immediate adjacency to Hong Kong provided an unparalleled, if illicit, economic gradient. In 1978, Hong Kong's per capita GDP was approximately 50 times that of Bao'an County. This created a massive gravitational pull for capital, goods, and labor, evident in the rampant smuggling and "secret crossing" (偷渡) activities. The 1977–1978 "Anti-Smuggling Campaigns" documented by the Shenzhen Public Security Bureau archives recorded over 12,000 interdictions annually in the region, a stark indicator of the pent-up economic energy at the border. The geographic proximity thus presented both a threat (capital flight, ideological contamination) and an irresistible opportunity (a window to global capital). The policy debate of 1978–1979 would hinge on how to manage this gradient: to suppress it or to harness it.
**1.2 Historical Sedimentation: From Migrant Corridor to Agricultural Hinterland**
The geographic marginality was layered over a deep history of human settlement and economic function that contradicts the notion of an empty wilderness. The area within the future SEZ had been continuously inhabited for at least 600 years, serving as a critical migration corridor and agricultural frontier for the Han Chinese expansion into the Lingnan region.
The earliest substantial settlement dates to the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644), when the imperial government established Bao'an County (宝安县) in 1573 to administer this border region and combat piracy. The county seat was located at what is now Nantou (南头), a walled town that served as the administrative and military center for centuries. The 1819 *Guangdong Province Map* (《广东舆图》) clearly marks Bao'an County, its walled city, and a network of villages and market towns along the rivers. This historical record directly refutes the idea of a "new" place; Shenzhen was simply the renaming and re-functionalization of an old administrative unit.
The region's primary historical role was as a transit corridor and demographic pressure valve. The Pearl River Delta was a major source of overseas Chinese labor migration from the 19th century onward. Many would-be emigrants from interior Guangdong (particularly Hakka communities from Huizhou and Meizhou) would pass through the Bao'an region on their way to the ports of Guangzhou or, illicitly, to Hong Kong. The 1911–1949 period saw a surge in this "pass-through" population. Census data from the Republic of China era is sparse, but clan genealogies (族谱) from villages like Chikan (赤坎) and Shatoujiao (沙头角) record significant male emigration rates, often exceeding 30% of the adult male population in some lineages. This created a pattern of circular migration and remittance flows that tied the local economy to global networks long before 1979.
Concurrently, the region developed as an agricultural hinterland specializing in perishable goods for the Hong Kong market. The alluvial soils of the Shenzhen River delta and the coastal plains were ideal for rice, sugarcane, and especially vegetable cultivation. The 1950s land reform and subsequent collectivization under the People's Commune system (人民公社) in 1958 reorganized this production. By 1978, the agricultural landscape was dominated by collective farms. The Bao'an County Agricultural Bureau's 1978 yearbook provides a detailed inventory: the future SEZ area contained approximately 42,000 mu (约2,800 hectares) of cultivated land, with the most intensive production in the Futian and Nanshan districts (then townships). The primary cash crop was fresh vegetables (叶菜类), with ove